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Abstract  
In this study we use the dynamic version of the GTAP model to analyse the 
effects of global trade policy changes and their interaction with different global 
climate policy regimes from Finland’s point of view, and in particular, 
implications for Finnish export sectors. Scenarios explore further trade 
liberalisation as well as effects of higher-than-current tariffs on world markets. 
As a complementary dimension we analyse the impact of a global climate 
agreement that will lead to an additional improvement in energy efficiency and 
impose limitations to GHG emissions.  
We find a general trend towards a greater weight of services sector in Finland’s 
total exports volume, whilst the share of traditionally important heavy industry 
and electronics industries declines. These trends are amplified by further trade 
liberalisation and slowed down by new barriers for trade. The global coverage of 
climate policy is particularly significant for energy-intensive industries. 
Key words: trade policy, climate policy, general equilibrium model 
JEL classification numbers: F13, Q58, C68  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan GTAP-mallin dynaamisen version avulla 
globaalien kauppapolitiikkamuutosten vaikutuksia Suomen näkökulmasta sekä 
kansainvälisten ilmastosopimusten toteuttamislaajuudesta riippuen. Erityisesti 
kiinnostuksen kohteena on Suomen vientiteollisuuden kehitys. Skenaarioissa 
tarkastellaan paitsi kaupan vapauttamisen vaikutuksia myös nykyistä 
korkeampien tullien seurauksia maailmanmarkkinoille. Täydentävänä 
ulottuvuutena analyysissä on globaali ilmastosopimus, joka asettaa 
kasvihuonekaasujen päästöille sitovat rajat ja jonka tuloksena energiatehokkuus 
maailmalaajuisesti paranee. 
Suomen kokonaisviennin kehityksessä havaitaan palvelusektorin osuuden 
kokonaisviennistä kasvavan tasaisesti samalla, kun perinteisesti vahvojen 
vientialojen, kuten raskaan teollisuuden ja elektroniikkateollisuuden, osuudet 
viennin kokonaisarvosta laskevat. Kaupan vapauttaminen vauhdittaa ja kaupan 
esteet hidastavat tätä kehitystä. Ilmastopolitiikan maailmanlaajuinen kattavuus on 
erityisen merkityksellistä energiaintensiiviselle teollisuudelle.  
Asiasanat: kauppapolitiikka, ilmastopolitiikka, yleisen tasapainon malli 
JEL-luokittelu: F13, Q58, C68  
 
Summary 
In this study we present four scenarios which attempt to illustrate the impacts of 
trade policies under different contexts, and analyse these scenarios with the 
dynamic version of the GTAP model. The scenarios include two dimensions: 
global trade policy changes and different global climate policy regimes. We 
assess the effects from Finland’s point of view, and in particular, implications to 
Finnish export sectors of further liberalisation or introduction of new trade 
barriers in two different climate policy regimes: a unilateral European policy, 
roughly corresponding to the present situation, and a globally covering 
agreement. 
We find a general trend towards a greater weight of services sector in Finland’s 
total exports volume, whilst the share of traditionally important heavy industry 
and electronics industries declines. Trade liberalisation tends to reduce the 
exporting volumes of the traditional manufacturing sectors whereas especially 
services sector benefit. Conversely, establishing new trade barriers tends to 
favour the old industries. 
For nearly all sectors, the changes due to trade liberalisation or bloc formation 
are more favourable or less detrimental when a global climate policy agreement 
is in place. This effect is particularly clear for energy intensive industries. 
Underlying drivers behind the general trends observable in all scenarios are the 
world markets for scarce commodities, namely energy, food and raw materials 
such as iron ore. These, in turn, are affected by the constantly increasing demand 
following the increase in global population and economic growth especially in 
Asia and the developing world. 
The results are in line with other similar studies on trade liberalisation conducted 
using applied general equilibrium models, and reflect the traditional gains from 
trade, on one hand, and the relative competitiveness effect on industries 
following different climate policy regimes.  
This study has been funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 
views expressed herein are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent 
the official position of the Ministry. 
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1. Introduction 
Integration of world markets has proceeded step by step during the past 60-odd 
years. Overall, the development has been positive: trade and foreign investment 
have increased rapidly as political barriers have been dismantled, and countries 
that have joined this integration have seen their economies and prosperity grow 
faster than those countries have remained outside the process. 
Presently there remain only relatively few and low tariffs in the trade of 
manufactured products between industrialised countries and more generally those 
countries that have joined the World Trade Organization, WTO. Non-tariff 
barriers are a more complicated and problematic issue nowadays than actual 
tariffs. 
In this study we use the dynamic version of the GTAP model to analyse the 
effects of further trade liberalisation (implementation of the Doha Round), and to 
analyse how higher-than-current tariffs would hit the world markets. 
As a complementary dimension we analyse the impact of a global climate 
agreement that we assume will lead to an additional annual improvement in 
energy efficiency by 0.5 per cent in the EEA and to a 1 per cent annual decrease 
in CO2 emissions in the rest of the world with an overall improvement in energy 
efficiency similar to that in the EEA. These two dimensions – trade 
liberalisation/restrictions and a global climate agreement – allow us to compare 
four different scenarios to our Reference Scenario. The latter includes the climate 
agreement implemented within the European Union to lower CO2 emissions, the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, and Russia’s forthcoming WTO 
membership which is potentially important from the Finnish point of view. 
Literature review 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been widely used and 
become a standard tool of international trade analysis. While the main purpose of 
the present study is not to conduct a detailed analysis of the possible WTO Doha 
round negotiation results, and hence the scenarios with trade liberalisation 
represent only a rather stylised version of tariff cuts based on earlier studies 
(namely Laborde and Martin 2010 a, b), the WTO negotiations provide us a 
useful frame of reference.  Anticipated impacts of the Doha round have been 
analysed in a number of applied studies since the negotiations were initiated. 
Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) already counted more than 1200 studies 
that analyse some aspect of the Doha negotiating round, of which roughly 400 
studies with numerical estimates. International organisations and research 
institutes that follow the negotiations closely are publishing numerical estimates 
of updated potential Doha agreements at a regular basis. Such institutes and 
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studies include, among others, the World Bank, International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) (Berishi-Krasniqi, et al, 2008; Laborde, et al, 2012) 
and Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Information Internationales (CEPII) 
(Decreux and Fontagné, 2008). 
Recent research that applies comparable methodologies in a context similar to 
this study includes, inter alia, Baltzer et al. (2009) on Doha round trade 
liberalisation from global and Danish perspective, focusing on agricultural and 
NAMA liberalisation but with additional scenarios on issues such as tariff 
escalation in agriculture and anti-concentration in NAMA. Globally oriented 
CGE analyses have been conducted e.g. by Decreux and Fontaigné (2008), 
estimating the outcome of an agreement with detailed provisions for agricultural 
and NAMA liberalisation as well as a simple assumption regarding services 
liberalisation, and Francois et al. (2005) with more generalised assumptions. 
Decreux and Fontagné use a dynamic model (MIRAGE) whereas a majority of 
the other studies is made with static models. Differences in methodology and 
scenario design make comparing the results of these studies not straightforward. 
Also the estimates for parameter values, such as Armington elasticities, which 
are very important in applied trade models, greatly affect the size of economic 
impacts.   
Though there has not so far been a thorough assessment of eventual future trade 
liberalisation implications for Finland based on a general equilibrium model, a 
handful of studies focus on a particular sector or policy question. For example, 
Huan-Niemi et al. (2010a) – which uses the same model and data as the  
present study – and Huan-Niemi et al (2009) assess WTO trade liberalisation 
implications to Finnish and EU agriculture and food industry. The 
competitiveness of energy intensive industries under different global or European 
climate policy regimes has been studied with the dynamic GTAP model in 
conjunction with VTT’s energy system models in a couple of recent research 
projects (Lehtilä et al. 2009; Niemi and Honkatukia 2010 a,b.) Furthermore, 
Sulamaa and Widgren (2005) and Kaitila (2007) have analysed the effects of free 
trade between the EU and Russia. 
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2. Main features of the scenarios 
Scenarios are descriptions of alternative development paths. In principle, there 
are an infinite number of them, and they can be constructed on the basis of 
several variables. For practical reasons their numbers must be limited to just 
some and the alternatives must be simplified and clearly differentiated. One 
criterion in the selection of the main variables is that they are as independent of 
each other as possible so that the resulting matrix of alternative scenarios will 
represent different future states of world with distinguishable driving forces. It is 
difficult, however, to find fully independent variables. 
First, we construct a Reference Scenario, to which the alternative scenarios 1–4 
are compared. The Reference Scenario includes the commonly accepted 
characteristics of the development of the world economy (see Table 1 and the 
annex for more specifications). One important development is the increasing 
shortage of at least some raw materials, and their increasing prices as a 
consequence. The Reference Scenario includes Russia’s membership in the 
WTO–a potentially important factor for Finnish foreign trade – as well as the 
already agreed climate policy of the EU and the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
We sketch the alternative scenarios on the basis of two policy dimensions:  
1) world trade agreements (global multilateralism vs. regional trade blocs) and  
2) climate policies. Global multilateralism, e.g. via the Doha objectives of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), will increase competition and improve 
resource allocation. International co-operation in climate policy (i.e. stricter 
limits to CO2 emissions etc.) will lead to the development of more energy-saving 
technologies and thus also to faster economic growth in an environmentally more 
sustainable way. These two variables (dimensions) are sufficiently independent 
from each other (see Figure 1). 
Regulation of foreign trade and investment affects the degree of freedom in the 
international economic activities of firms. This in turn is related to economic 
growth. Multilateralism promotes the efficient allocation of resources globally. In 
Scenarios 1 and 2, the remaining obstacles (in terms of tariffs) to trade in 
manufactured goods will be dismantled, and progress will be made in lowering 
barriers to trade in services and agricultural goods (see Table 1). On the other 
hand, Scenarios 3 and 4 can be described as steps backwards for the world 
economy because tariffs will actually be raised from their current levels. 
Development in energy efficiency is the second dimension. This results from 
technological development following the formation of a global climate policy 
(Scenarios 1 and 3). We assume that the policy will be promoted by creating 
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standards for firms and individuals internationally. It will be spurred further by 
national innovation policies. 
A priori, Scenario 1 can be regarded as the best scenario at the global level and 
Scenario 4 as the worst from the point of view of economic development and 
international cooperation: Scenario 1 includes both ‘good’ elements and Scenario 
4 neither of them. The actual consequences of these scenarios are, however, 
multidimensional and not as clear-cut as a priori reasoning may indicate. We will 
see that the effects of the international climate policy on world output will be 
stronger than those of further trade liberalisation. This is seen in Scenario 3, 
where the positive global effects of climate policy outweigh the negative effects 
of a halt (and indeed a turnaround) in trade liberalisation. World trade in 
manufactured goods is already rather free and the effects of additional steps are 
limited. 
Figure 1  Main features of the four scenarios (see also Table 1) 
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Mutual Suspicion 
 
- Mediocre GDP growth 
- Technology 
improvements not fully 
exploited due to obstacles 
in international trade. 
 
No international 
climate policy 
 
CO2 emission reduction 
policies only in the EU 
Moderate energy 
efficiency improvement 
only in the EU 
Scenario 2: 
Multilateralism 
 
- Mediocre GDP growth 
- Diminished 
competitiveness of EU 
energy-intensive 
industries 
- Moderate gains from 
trade through allocation 
and more efficient use of 
technologies. 
Scenario 4: 
Blocs 
 
- Slow GDP growth 
- Diminished 
competitiveness of EU 
energy-intensive 
industries, but 
compensated with tariff 
protection 
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3. Description of the GTAP model and data 
The simulations in this study employ the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
database and the VATT version of the dynamic GTAP model, a recursive-
dynamic applied general equilibrium model. General equilibrium (CGE) models 
are nowadays a standard tool for analysis where large economic shocks can have 
an impact on both the production and price levels of the economy. TAP model 
applications are widely used in research, particularly in a broad scope of 
international trade. A more detailed description of the model is provided in the 
technical annex to this report. 
The GTAP 7.1 Database (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) contains data for 
regional economies based on input-output tables, and complete bilateral trade 
information, transport and protection linkages among 112 regions for all 57 
commodities for a single year base year (2004). The regions and commodities in 
the database cover, with few exceptions, the entire volume of the world (formal 
sector) economy. For the purposes of this study, this data has been aggregated to 
18 regions and 22 commodities (see the technical annex for details). The first 
criterion in selecting the regions and commodities for aggregation is their 
importance to Finland’s foreign trade, based on the current situation and recent 
trends or perceived potential for growth. In the regional aggregation, existing free 
trade arrangements and customs unions have also been taken into account, as this 
allows a more accurate treatment of import tariffs in the trade liberalisation 
scenarios. Conversely, in the commodity aggregation, primary products have 
been kept separate as their demand and price developments underlie global trade 
trends, although these products constitute only a small fraction of the total trade 
volume. 
The GTAP model assumes current production and trade structures as starting 
points. These structures change endogenously in different scenarios. The model 
does not, however, assume any explicit policy changes beyond trade and climate 
policies or any strategic changes in the firm behaviour. These kinds of changes 
will certainly happen in the future. One aim of our study is indeed to point out 
outcomes of trade policy changes in different global contexts, so that also policy 
makers and firms can anticipate them and be prepared to change their course of 
action, if necessary. 
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4. Outcomes in different scenarios 
In the following, we will present the GTAP model results in the different 
scenarios. We start by formulating the Reference Scenario. After that we will 
present, in Section 6, development in each of the Scenarios 1-4 relative to the 
predicted development in the Reference Scenario. 
Table 1 shows the policy changes made in the four scenarios at different points in 
time. Trade liberalisation will proceed in steps: Russia’s WTO membership in 
three steps between 2012 and 2018, and the Doha Round in six steps between 
2013 and 2023. On the other hand, the trade restrictions in Scenarios 3 and 4 will 
be raised all at once in 2015. The global climate policy will be implemented all at 
once from the onset in 2010. Our analysis covers the years 2010–2030. 
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Table 1 Trade and climate policy changes in the different scenarios  
 
   2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
→ 
 
Reference Scenario 
 Trade policy Russia   1  2  3  3        
 CAP  1               
Climate 
policy 
EU →                
 
In addition to these in the other scenarios: 
 
 
Scenario 1: Sustainable Prosperity
 Trade policy Doha    1  2  3  4  5  6   
Climate 
policy 
World →                
 
Scenario 2: Multilateralism 
 Trade policy Doha    1  2  3  4  5  6   
Climate 
policy 
–                 
 
Scenario 3: Mutual Suspicion  
 Trade policy Blocks      →           
Climate 
policy 
World →                
 
Scenario 4: Blocks 
 Trade policy Blocks      →           
Climate 
policy 
–                 
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Russia in WTO (In the Reference Scenario and in the other four scenarios) 
Reforms required for Russian accession to WTO are implemented in three stages (2012, 2014 and 2018). In stages 1 and 2, total tariff cuts ranging from 19% to 23%, 
depending on sector, are implemented for all sectors not classified as sensitive, and all agricultural domestic subsidies are reduced by half. Tariff cuts for sensitive 
products (agriculture, motor vehicles, and other transport equipment) are implemented with a slower schedule in stages 2 and 3. 
 
CAP reform (In the Reference Scenario and in the other four scenarios) 
Removal of all remaining export subsidies for the agrifood sector as part of the ‘Health check’ of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy reform. Implemented in 2011. 
 
Doha round (Scenarios 1 and 2) 
Import tariffs estimated by Leborde and Martin (2010 a, 2010b) and implemented in six stages. Stages 1 to 3 (2013, 2015 and 2017) consist of gradual tariff cuts in 
high-income countries. In stages 4 to 6 (2019, 2021 and 2023), tariffs are lowered in developing countries and newly admitted member countries. Average tariffs 
before and after Doha Round cuts are as follows: 
  All high-income countries EU Middle-income countries Least Developed Countries 
 Manufactured goods 1.6%  1.0% 1.8%  1.0% 6.1%  4.6% 10.9%  8.0% 
 Agricultural products 31%  3% 24%  2% 53% 33% 94%  59% 
 
Bloc tariffs (Scenarios 3 and 4) 
The world is divided into four ‘blocks: Western Europe (= European Economic Area, EEA), Eastern Europe (Russia and rest of the former Soviet Union), the 
Americas, and ‘The Chinese Hegemony’ (China, South-East Asia and Developing Africa). Japan and Australia are left outside the blocks. An additional and uniform 
10% tariff is applied from 2015 onwards to all imports from outside the trading blocs. 
 
EU climate policy (In the Reference Scenario and in the other four scenarios) 
EU+EFTA: current policy, translating into a 1% annual decrease in CO2 emissions. An improvement in energy efficiency to allow a 20% reduction in the use of 
primary energy (2020 compared to 1990). No climate policy change in the rest of the world, and thus no energy efficiency improvement there. Implementation: total 
period. 
 
World climate policy (Scenarios 1 and 3) 
EU+EFTA: An additional annual improvement in energy efficiency by 0.5%. In the rest of the world, a 1% annual decrease in CO2 emissions and an overall 
improvement in energy efficiency similar to EU-EFTA. Implementation: total period. 
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5. Reference Scenario 
5.1 Assumptions 
The Reference Scenario encompasses ‘normal’ structural change due to changes 
in GDP and population growth in different regions. We use the growth 
projections for population, labour force, productivity and GDP by international 
organisations (United Nations, IMF, World Bank and ILO) and from a global 
economy scenario developed for use by a comparable simulation model by the 
French CEPII research institute (Fouré et al. 2012). Information from a baseline 
scenario produced by the VATTAGE model for Finland is used to adjust the 
Finnish economic development in the reference scenario (see the Appendix). 
We assume that the EU commitments already made in terms of CO2 emissions 
will continue. A potentially important factor for Finland, Russia’s WTO 
membership, is taken into account already in the Reference Scenario, because it 
has already been settled (see Figure 32 in the Appendix for the impact on Finnish 
exports to Russia following the WTO membership). 
One underlying hypothesis is that population growth will lead to increasing 
demand for food produced with limited land resources. This will lead to 
increasing food prices as productivity growth is not expected to keep up with the 
increase in demand for food. The share of the ‘agrifood’ sector in total world 
output (in terms of both value and quantity) will nevertheless increase. The share 
in total value will increase more than in total quantity because of the increase in 
relative food prices. This logic will also apply to many raw materials (like 
ferrous metals). Meanwhile, also the share of services in world GDP will 
increase due to structural changes in demand and technology. 
5.2 GDP 
In the Reference Scenario, world GDP growth in constant prices will average 3.1 
per cent over the next 20 years. Finnish GDP growth will average 1.9 per cent. 
Average GDP growth in the other regions ranges from 1.3 per cent in Japan to 
7.7 per cent in China (see details in the Annex, Table 5.). In all regions, the GDP 
growth is driven by increase in productivity and capital intensity. Labour force 
growth in most of the developed world is very modest or even negative. In the 
developing world, total labour force grows on average between 1 and 3 per cent 
§annually. Details are presented in Table 6 in the Annex. 
The share of the EEA region (EU and EFTA) in world GDP in current prices will 
decline from 31 per cent to 23 from 2010 to 2030 and that of North America 
from 31 to 25 per cent (see Figure 2). The share of the high-income Asia-Pacific 
region will decline from 14 to 10 per cent. On the other hand, China’s share will 
rise from 7 to 16 % and that of India from 2 to 5 per cent. 
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As the economic weight of East and South Asia will increase in the world, also 
growth in export markets will concentrate there. Europe, as a wealthy and 
geographically close internal market, will remain the most important trading 
partner for Finland, but its share in total trade will decline in all scenarios. 
 
Figure 2 World GDP shares by regions, per cent, computed from current 
prices USD (not purchasing power) 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Structure of the Finnish economy 
Figure 3 presents the structure of the Finnish GDP in the Reference Scenario in 
2010, 2020 and 2030 in current prices. The share of business services in total 
GDP will rise from the current 23 per cent to 26 per cent by 2030. Also the share 
of transportation will increase from 8 to 12 per cent. Meanwhile the share of 
manufacturing will decline from 25 to 22 per cent and that of other services, 
including public services, from 33 to 30 per cent (see the Appendix for detailed 
list of sector-wise aggregation). 
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Figure 3 Decomposition of output (value added, current prices) in Finland 
in the Reference Scenario in 2010, 2020 and 2030 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Structure of Finnish foreign trade 
Figure 4 shows the development of Finnish total trade in the Reference Scenario, 
both in terms of value and share in the total. Total exports will growth at an 
average annual rate of 2.3 per cent and total imports by 2.7 per cent. On average, 
the exports in services will grow by 4.5 per cent, manufactured goods by 1.3 per 
cent and primary production by 2.0 per cent. Imports will grow by 1.7, 2.6 and 
3.5 per cent, respectively.  
As both exports from and imports from Finland grow faster than the GDP, we 
observe an increasing the importance of foreign trade for the Finnish economy 
during the simulation period. In 2010, the value of both imports and exports were 
around 40 per cent of the Finnish GDP. In 2030, the simulated value of exports 
from Finland is 55 per cent of the GDP whereas the value of imports to Finland 
reaches almost 70 per cent of the GDP.  
Consequently, the share of services in total exports will rise from 27 per cent in 
2010 to 41 per cent in 2030, while the share of manufactured goods will decline 
from 72 per cent to 58 per cent. A disaggregation of different types of services 
shows us that the share of other services will rise from 3 to 5 per cent, that of 
business services from 13 to 20 per cent, the share of construction and trade from 
6 to 7 per cent, and the share of transportation from 5 to 9 per cent of total 
exports. 
 12 
 
The shares will be much more stable in imports with the share of services 
declining from 12 to 10 per cent, that of manufactured goods remaining at 71 per 
cent and that of primary production rising from 17 to 20 per cent. 
 
Figure 4 Structure and value of Finnish total exports and imports by 
sectors in the Reference Scenario (current prices) 
 
 
 
 
Shares of total exports 2010 2020 2030 
Services 27 % 32 % 41 % 
   Other services 3 % 4 % 5 % 
   Business services 13 % 14 % 20 % 
   Construction and trade 6 % 7 % 7 % 
   Transportation 5 % 7 % 9 % 
Industries 72 % 67 % 58 % 
Primary production 1 % 1 % 1 % 
Shares of total imports 2010 2020 2030 
Services 12 % 10 % 10 % 
Industries 71 % 70 % 71 % 
Primary production 17 % 20 % 20 % 
 
 
 
The value of total exports to the EEA will grow by 34 per cent between 2010 and 
2030 and the value of exports to non-EEA countries by 94 per cent. Exports to 
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Russia will grow by 83 per cent, Eastern Europe by 75 per cent, North America 
by 16 per cent, South America by 67 per cent, high-income Asia-Pacific by 7 per 
cent, China by 216 per cent, South-East Asia by 106 per cent, India by 243 per 
cent, the Middle East and North Africa by 74 per cent and Sub-Saharan Africa by 
258 per cent. 
Such diverging growth patterns will of course lead to changes in the regional 
structure of exports. The share of the EEA countries in total Finnish exports was 
58 per cent in 2010. According to the Reference Scenario, this share will decline 
to 49 per cent by the year 2030. Meanwhile, the share in imports will go from 59 
to 61 per cent. 
The Reference Scenario then also includes the following larger changes in shares 
of Finnish total export destinations between 2010 and 2030: Russia from 12.8 to 
14.7 per cent, North America from 6.3 to 4.6 per cent, high-income Asia-Pacific 
from 2.5 to 1.7 per cent, China from 4.5 to 8.9 per cent, South-East Asia from 3.3 
to 4.3 per cent, India from 0.9 to 1.9 per cent, the Middle East and North Africa 
from 5.7 to 6.3 per cent and Sub-Saharan Africa from 2.1 to 4.7 per cent. Figure 
6 shows the per cent distribution of total non-EEA exports; the figures there are 
of course different due to a different denominator. 
 
Figure 5 Finnish exports by destinations in the Reference Scenario 
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Figure 6 Finnish exports to non-EEA countries by destinations in the 
Reference Scenario 
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6. Four trade and climate policy scenarios 
Sections 5.1 to 5.4 present the results from our four scenarios. For the most part, 
the results are presented as per-cent differences relative to the results in the 
Reference Scenario depicted above in Section 5. In broad terms, we observe 
similar effects of trade policies and climate policies in all scenarios. The results 
are presented below by scenario. Common features and overall comparisons 
between scenarios are discussed under the first scenario.  
6.1 Scenario 1: Sustainable Prosperity 
Scenario 1 differs from the Reference Scenario in that tariffs on foreign trade will 
be further lowered which will improve resource allocation at a global level. 
Furthermore, a global climate policy agreement will lead to global CO2 emission 
reduction policies and an improvement in energy efficiency. Both dimensions 
will support faster GDP growth. 
6.1.1 GDP 
As we can see from Figure 7a, Scenario 1, i.e. ‘Sustainable Prosperity’, will lead 
to the fastest world GDP per capita1 growth of all the scenarios. The difference of 
the GDP per capita level to that in the Reference Scenario is 2.1 per cent in 2020 
and 3.7 per cent in 2030. The difference grows over time and therefore the 
difference in terms of accumulated consumption is much larger than this. 
Scenario 1 offers considerable gains for the EU, too, as can be seen from Figure 
7b. GDP and GDP per capita will be 2.6 per cent higher than in the Reference 
Scenario in 2020 and already 7.3 per cent higher in 2030. However, as can be 
seen from the fact that there is hardly any difference between Scenarios 1 and 3 
for the EU, further trade liberalisation has little to offer the Union. Instead, the 
value of global climate policy is considerable for the EU as can be seen from the 
difference to the other two scenarios. The difference is that the EU already has a 
regional climate policy in the Reference Scenario which makes output in the 
Union less competitive. Global climate policy would level the playing field vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. 
Sustainable Prosperity is the best Scenario for Finland, too. Relative to the 
Reference Scenario, GDP will be 2.2 per cent higher in 2020 and 4.5 per cent 
higher in 2030. Unlike for the EU on average, there is a difference between this 
scenario and Scenario 3.  
                                              
1 And also GDP, because population growth is the same in all the scenarios. 
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Figure 7a World GDP per capita (constant prices) in Scenario 1 relative to 
Reference Scenario, % 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7b  EU GDP per capita (constant prices) Scenario 1 relative to 
Reference Scenario, % 
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Figure 7c  Finland GDP per capita (constant prices) Scenario 1 relative to 
Reference Scenario, % 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Sector-specific developments in Finland 
In Scenario 1, growth in services (value added, constant prices) will be faster in 
Finland than growth in manufacturing and primary production. Overall, this is a 
normal and dominant trend in industrialised countries. In particular, value added 
will grow faster in construction and trade, other services and business services. 
Finnish output in primary production will be close to the Reference Scenario 
throughout the 20-year period. Manufacturing output will first lag behind the 
Reference Scenario but it will then catch up with the latter towards the end of the 
2020s. Transportation will do worse than in the Reference Scenario. 
The faster development in value added is due to a more efficient allocation of 
resources across the world following the policy changes described above. 
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Figure 8 Value added in constant prices in Finland in Scenario 1, 
difference between Scenario 1 and Reference Scenario, % 
 
 
 
 
The most favourable scenario in terms of the development of Finnish value 
added, i.e. GDP, is Scenario 1, ‘Sustainable Prosperity’ (see Figure 7c). The four 
scenarios differ quite a lot in their sector-specific developments. This depends on 
the trade and competition patterns of Finnish exports in different regions of the 
world. The biggest changes in Figure 7c take place in Scenarios 3 and 4 where 
tariffs are raised. In this section we will concentrate on the impact in Scenario 1, 
however. 
Relative to the Reference Scenario, ‘Sustainable Prosperity’ brings the largest 
gains in terms of value added in the production of paper and wood products as 
well as raw materials and services. On the other hand, the output of ferrous 
metals and chemical products fairs worse than in the Reference Scenario. 
Interestingly, the ‘old’ comparative advantage that Finland has in forest 
industries is strengthened in this particular scenario: Under unilateral European 
climate policy, energy-intensive industries suffer an additional competitive 
disadvantage as the energy prices increase following the emissions reduction 
policies. In the scenarios with global climate policy, however, producers outside 
Europe face similar energy price increases. Industries that are predominantly 
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exporting to the European market, such as forest industry (nearly 85 per cent of 
exports go to EEA countries) obtain only minimal gains from further trade 
liberalisation, as can be expected. Conversely, these same sectors are affected the 
most by unilateral climate policy.  
On the other hand, the ‘new’ comparative advantage in electronic equipment is 
not affected by the combination of a more liberal trade and global climate policy. 
It instead enjoys a boost when tariffs are raised (Scenarios 3 and 4). It should be 
noted that this increase applies to manufactured products and can be explained by 
slower relocation of such production to countries with lower costs. In contrast, 
less labour and capital resources will available for services, which would produce 
higher value added, as resources are used for manufacturing in Finland.  
 
Figure 9 Finnish value added in constant prices in 2030, difference to 
Reference Scenario, % 
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6.1.3 Foreign trade 
The share of the EEA countries in Finnish exports is expected to decline in all 
scenarios. This is due to faster growth in non-EEA markets (see table 4 in 
Appendix for the data in the Reference Scenario).The introduction of new inter-
block tariffs will turn the clock backwards in this respect as can be seen from 
Figure 10, but after the shock the development will continue. Scenario 1 shows a 
little more moderate development in terms of the decline in the EEA share 
compared with the Reference Scenario. 
 
Figure 10 The share of EEA countries in total Finnish exports, %  
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There is very little change between Scenario 1 and the Reference Scenario in 
terms of the value of exports to the EEA. Exports to non-EEA countries will 
develop somewhat worse than in the Reference scenario. Naturally, large 
differences with respect to the reference scenario arise in Scenarios 3 and 4, 
where new tariff barriers are erected between trading blocks. In those cases 
exports to non-EEA countries will suffer heavily, and trading with EEA countries 
will increase. Even though new markets are found, weaker global resource 
allocation will lead to lower welfare and utility levels. 
The relative competitiveness of the Finnish energy-intensive industry is better 
when other countries, too, have ambitious climate policies, and the increase in 
transportation costs will favour trade with neighbouring countries. 
 
Figure 11  Finnish exports to EEA, %-difference to Reference Scenario 
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Figure 12 Finnish exports to non-EEA countries, %-difference to Reference 
Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Compared with the Reference Scenario, the value of Finnish exports will decline 
by almost 4 per cent before starting a gradual catching up in the mid-2020s. This 
is due to a relative revival in manufactured exports. On the other hand, the value 
of exports of total services and primary output will continue to decline. This is 
due to a decline in transportation services and other services. On the other hand, 
the value of business services and construction and trade will increase. Note that 
these are all relative to the Reference Scenario. As can be seen from Figure 12 
above, the value of exports does continue to grow throughout the analysis period. 
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Figure13 Value of total Finnish exports in Scenario 1, %-difference to 
Reference Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 shows a more disaggregated picture of sector-specific developments in 
the value of total Finnish exports in the four scenarios. The results reflect the 
ones shown above for value added. Relative to the Reference Scenario, Scenario 
1 is good for the exports of forest industry products. In all other sectors, the 
difference is either rather close to zero but negative or, in the case of raw 
materials, strongly negative. 
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Figure 14 Total Finnish exports in 2030, difference to Reference  
Scenario, % 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 14, the sector-specific differences to the Reference 
Scenario in the total exports to other EEA countries by the year 2030 are 
relatively small. Raw material exports gain the most, 19 per cent, followed by 
forest industry products (over 15 per cent), and machinery and equipment (13 per 
cent). The exports of chemical products decline by 7 per cent relative to the 
Reference Scenario. 
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Figure 15 Total Finnish exports to other EEA countries in 2030, difference 
to Reference Scenario, % 
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Figure 16 shows how exports to Russia will develop in the four scenarios relative 
to the Reference Scenario.2 Scenario 1 has a positive impact on the exports to 
Russia of raw materials, energy and forest industry products. However, total 
exports are lower as all other sectors show weaker export developments. This is 
largely explained by the impacts of the policy changes on Russia’s GDP and total 
demand, which is hit hard both by trade barriers and by emission reductions. 
 
Figure 16 Total Finnish exports to Russia in 2030, difference to Reference 
Scenario, % 
 
 
 
                                              
2 The significance of the Russian WTO membership is shown separately in the Appendix, Figure …. The 
WTO membership is present in all the scenarios. The overall impact of the membership in 2030 is an 
almost 13 per cent increase in the value of total exports to Russia relative to the situation where Russia 
does not join the WTO. The impact is the largest in machinery and equipment nec (+20%),  
motor vehicles and parts (+16%) and wood products (16%), followed by 10–12% increases in paper 
products, ferrous metals, transport equipment nec and electronic equipment, each. 
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Total exports to China grow by 5 per cent by 2030 as a result of the policy 
changes implemented in Scenario 1 when compared to the Reference Scenario. 
We witness a jump of around 30 per cent in the exports of wood products, 
chemical, rubber, plastic products, and ferrous metals. The implementation of 
additional tariffs in Scenarios 3 and 4 would have a significant negative impact 
on trade between Finland and China. 
 
Figure 17 Total Finnish exports to China in 2030, difference to Reference 
Scenario, % 
 
 
 
 
The value of imports rises slightly in Scenario 1 with respect to the Reference 
Scenario.  
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Figure 18 Value of total Finnish imports, %-difference to Reference 
Scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Total Finnish imports in 2030, %-difference to reference 
scenario 
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The Sustainable Prosperity Scenario is the worst from the point of view of the 
Finnish trade balance, i.e. the difference between the exports and imports of 
goods and services. The difference (i.e. a relative trade deficit) to the Reference 
Scenario increases continuously and reaches almost 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2030. 
Consequently, more emphasis must be put to, among other things, labour market 
policies to support competitiveness.3 If this scenario seems to be the most 
realistic one, Finnish firms should also be prepared to adjust to the changing 
demand pattern. This means putting more emphasis on business services, 
cleantech etc.  Otherwise the Finnish economy will run to problems with the 
external balance that will in the long run slow economic growth. 
 
Figure 20 Finnish trade balance, difference to Reference Scenario, % of 
GDP 
 
 
 
One factor that affects the trade balance is the terms of trade, i.e. the ratio of 
export prices to import prices. The terms of trade will deteriorate continuously in 
Scenario 1 relative to the Reference Scenario and the value of exports decreases 
steadily whilst the value of imports is affected less or increases. The volume of 
manufacturing production will also be lower than in the Reference Scenario. (See 
Figure 8.) 
                                              
3 The trade balance actually deteriorates considerably in the Reference Scenario up until the mid-2020s 
after which it starts to rebalance. This means that there may be a need for competitiveness-mending 
policies in all cases. In the GTAP model, economic instabilities will adjust over time, but as we have not 
considered balance of payments policies or targets, choosing to focus on trade patterns, the adjustment 
may be clearly slower than in reality as price competitiveness deteriorates. 
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Figure 21 Terms of trade, %-difference to Reference Scenario 
 
 
 
 
6.1.4 Consumer utility and welfare 
At the whole economy level, it is important to distinguish the impacts of a policy 
on welfare or consumer utility from the national accounting figures. For example, 
relation between GDP growth and welfare gain is not straightforward, and the 
economic theory shows that a policy can even be welfare-increasing while 
slowing down GDP growth, and vice versa.  
GTAP calculates welfare gains and losses on the basis of equivalent variation 
(EV) for the representative consumer. It is an abstract measurement of amount of 
additional income needed to give the level of utility which an individual could 
have reached if the economic environment had changed. As such, it depends on 
the model parameters used in calculation of “utility” and therefore cannot be 
taken as a precise measure of the benefits or disadvantages from a policy. 
Nevertheless, it provides a more sophisticated indication on welfare impacts than 
for example bare GDP growth. 
As we can see from Figure 22a–c, Scenario 1 is the best one from the point of 
view of consumer utility for the world, the EU and Finland. The welfare gain in 
the global climate policy scenarios, as well as the similar development in the 
GDP between the scenarios, can be largely attributed to the productivity increase 
from the energy efficiency. As this is an assumption built into the scenario 
design, and therefore cannot be interpreted directly as gains from climate policy 
implementation.  
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Figure 22a World: Equivalent variation (cumulative) calculation for 
regional household income, %-difference to Reference Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22b EU: Equivalent variation (cumulative) calculation for regional 
household income, %-difference to Reference Scenario 
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Figure 22c Finland: Equivalent variation (cumulative) calculation for 
regional household income, %-difference to Reference Scenario 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Scenario 2: Multilateralism (without energy efficiency) 
Scenario 2 includes the more liberal trade regime but no international climate 
policies (the EU level climate policies still stand).Because the effect of the 
liberalization of trade is smaller than that of an international climate policy the 
differences to the Reference Scenario will a priori be rather small. 
6.2.1 GDP 
Looking at the development of GDP per capita relative to the Reference 
Scenario, we see that there are very little differences with Scenario 2 (see Figures 
7a-c above). The Finnish GDP per capita is 1 per cent higher in 2030, but the 
World and EU averages are very close to that in the Reference Scenario.. This is 
evidence that as trade barriers are already quite low for manufactured goods, 
their overall lowering has very little additional impact.4 
These results are consistent with findings of other studies analysing the Doha 
agreement, which has been, indeed, criticised for its and the small size of its 
estimated economic effects. For example Baltzer et. al. (2009) estimated a 0.2 
percent growth in global GDP due to the Doha agreement. However, the scenario 
                                              
4 On the other hand, there are considerable non-tariff barriers that we do not take into account in this 
analysis. 
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analysed in the present paper, like most of the other similar studies, do not 
incorporate provisions for e.g. services liberalisation and trade facilitation, which 
a Doha agreement is to include. For the services liberalisation, Decreux and 
Fontagné (2008) suggest that it could add another 25 percent to their global 
welfare estimates. 
 
6.2.2 Sector-specific developments in Finland 
Looking at sector-specific development in the Finnish economy, we find that–
relative to the Reference Scenario–transportation, construction and trade, in 
particular, grow more by the year 2030, while primary production and 
manufacturing output will lag a little behind. However, the differences are rather 
small. This can also be seen in the more disaggregated Figure 9 above. The 
largest (but still very small) differences in constant prices in 2030 are in 
production of machinery and equipment, and motor vehicles5 and parts. 
Figure 23 Value added in constant prices, difference between Scenario 2 
and Reference Scenario, % 
 
 
 
                                              
5 The results on motor vehicles and parts must be interpreted with caution, as the trade data includes 
transhipments, which forms a major part of the Finnish trade in this sector. 
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6.2.3 Foreign trade 
In line with relatively small differences in value added (always compared with 
the Reference Scenario), also the changes in the value of exports over the next 20 
years is rather small. However, with the disaggregation presented in Figure 14, it 
is notable that the differences are positive. The largest ones (3 per cent) are found 
in primary production. However, this is due to a rise in export prices, not 
volumes. 
There is also very little difference with respect to the destination countries. 
Figure 24 Value of Finnish exports in Scenario 2, %-difference to Reference 
Scenario 
 
 
 
Looking at Figure 15, 16 and 17 above, where we find the impact on exports by 
scenarios and industries, there is a small overall increase in the exports (value) of 
motor vehicles and parts by the year 2030. The exports of agrifood decline 
slightly in the Russian market. There are a little more developments, always 
positive, in the exports to China, with an around 10 per cent increase in the value 
of manufactured goods. The overall trade balance remains very close to the 
Reference Scenario. The terms of trade will also develop much like in the 
Reference Scenario. 
6.2.4 Consumer utility and welfare 
As we can see from Figure 22a–c above, Scenario 2 is very close to the 
Reference Scenario from the point of view of consumer utility for the world, the 
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EU and Finland. Consequently, the implementation of the Doha Round does not 
seem to have a significant impact on consumer utility. 
6.3 Scenario 3: Mutual Suspicion 
Scenario 3 differs from the above two scenarios in that further trade liberalisation 
comes to a halt, and actually turns around. The world is assumed to be divided 
into four regions: Western Europe (i.e. European Economic Area, EEA), Eastern 
Europe (Russia + former Soviet Union), the Americas, and ‘The Chinese 
Hegemony’ (China, South-East Asia, Developing Africa). Japan and Australia 
are left outside these blocks. An additional and uniform 10% tariff is applied 
from 2015 onwards to all imports from outside the trading blocs. This can be 
clearly seen in the graphs. As a consequence, import prices rise and trade is 
reduced globally. 
On the other hand, we assume that despite the lifting of trade barriers, the global 
climate change is taken seriously and an international climate policy agreement is 
reached. Admittedly, this combination may seem a little far-fetched, but the 
scenario does show the impact of the assumed energy-saving innovations and the 
levelling of the playing field in this respect at the global level. 
6.3.1 GDP 
As a result of the rise in tariffs, inter-block trade will decrease and intra-block 
trade will increase. This weakens the efficient allocation of resources at a global 
level. As a result, GDP growth will take a hit as can be seen in Figure 7a–c. The 
impact on the EU seems rather small, even non-existent, while it is much more 
significant to the world as a whole and to Finland. Nevertheless, GDP will grow 
faster than in the Reference Scenario. 
Consequently, the international climate agreement (i.e. improvement in energy 
efficiency) outweighs the negative impact of the higher tariffs. In Finland, the 
difference between Scenarios 1 and 3 diverges, and is approximately the same as 
between scenarios 2 and 4, implying that in the model the advantage for Finland 
of the stricter global climate regime is similar regardless of the trade policy 
regime in place. This may be due to the rather energy-intensive production 
structure of the Finnish manufacturing sector and the long transportation 
distances.  
6.3.2 Sector-specific developments in Finland 
Looking at the sector-specific developments in Finland, we see that 
transportation services take a considerable hit, but other sectors, as identified, 
actually grow faster than in the Reference Scenario. Business services are not 
much affected, but the value added of primary production and other services will 
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be about 4 per cent higher in the 2020s than in the Reference Scenario. The 
raising of the tariffs in 2015 has a positive effect on the relative value added of 
manufacturing and primary production. 
The graph above (Figure 9) shows a more disaggregated picture of the difference 
between Scenario 3 and the Reference scenario in 2030. The higher tariffs will 
have a very positive effect on the output of electronic equipment, as they 
considerably slow down the relocation of the manufacturing to the countries with 
low production costs. This, however, is reflected in lower GDP growth as seen 
above, when the resources do not move to higher value added generating services 
sectors. The effect is also positive in forest industry products, other transport 
equipment and raw materials. We find a negative effect in ferrous metals as well 
as machinery and equipment. 
Figure 25 Value added in constant prices, difference between Scenario 3 
and Reference Scenario, % 
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6.3.3 Foreign trade 
The value of total Finnish exports declines considerably when the tariffs are 
raised. The immediate average effect is about 3 per cent, but service exports in 
particular decline much more. No sector manages to regain its lost export value 
relative to the Reference Scenario. 
 
Figure 26 Value of Finnish exports in Scenario 3, %-difference to Reference 
scenario 
 
 
 
 
As we saw in Figure 10 above, the share of the EEA countries in Finnish exports 
rises by over 10 percentage points immediately after the tariffs have been raised. 
Relative to the Reference Scenario, the value of exports to the EEA countries 
rises by almost 15 per cent, while the value of exports to non-EEA countries 
declines by almost 30 per cent. 
Reflecting the changes in value added, the export value of electronic equipment 
will rise by 30 by the year 2030. Other positive changes vis-à-vis the Reference 
Scenario are found in the exports of forest industries and other transport 
equipment. Climate policy favours these sectors, because the global climate 
agreement is a relative burden for the non-EU countries. We find a negative 
impact on the value of exports in raw materials, energy, motor vehicles, services 
and the agrifood sector. To large extent, the effects on primary products can be 
attributed to the world price developments: especially the pre-tax prices for fossil 
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fuels are considerably lower in the scenarios with global climate policy (for crude 
oil up to 33 per cent compared to the reference scenario). A smaller world price 
effect to same direction is also observed for primary agricultural products and 
other raw materials.  
As already noted, exports to other EEA countries will rise as trade is diverted 
away from inter-block relations. The biggest rises relative to the Reference 
Scenario are found in electronic equipment with an increase of about 80 per cent 
in value by the year 2030. Strong developments are also found in other 
machinery and equipment, and transport equipment, followed by forest industry 
products and raw materials.  
The picture is of course the opposite when we look at how exports to Russia and 
China will develop after tariffs are raised. The biggest relative losers in the 
Russian market are ferrous metals and energy, as well as other machinery and 
equipment and chemical products. In the Chinese market, the losses are the 
largest in all machinery and equipment, and transport equipment. 
The terms of trade in Scenario 3 will deteriorate dramatically as a result of the 
2015 tariff hike relative to the Reference Scenario. The overall development in 
the terms of trade is the worst of all the four scenarios. On the other hand, the 
trade balance will actually be better than in the Reference Scenario, and the 
second-best of all four scenarios. 
6.3.4 Consumer utility and welfare 
As we can see from Figure 22a–c above, Scenario 3 is relatively close to 
Scenario 1 and much better than the Reference Scenario from the point of view 
of consumer utility for the world, the EU and Finland. Actually for the EU 
Scenarios 1 and 3 have very little difference. 
6.4 Scenario 4: Blocs 
Our worst-case scenario combines the higher inter-block tariffs as described 
above and no global climate policy agreement. 
6.4.1 GDP 
With the raising of tariffs in 2015, world GDP will immediately decline by 0.5 
per cent relative to the Reference Scenario. The same will happen in Finland. On 
the other hand, EU GDP does not seem to be affected, and as time goes by, it 
actually rises higher than in the Reference Scenario. For the EU GDP, the 
Reference Scenario and the Multilateralism Scenario are the worst ones, while 
for the world and for Finland, Scenario 4 is the worst. As noted earlier, at the 
global level, the GDP gains in the world-wide climate policy scenarios (scenarios 
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1 and 3) is to a large extent explained by the assumption about energy efficiency, 
which leads to considerable productivity difference in favour of the climate 
policy scenarios. 
6.4.2 Sector-specific developments in Finland 
Transportation, in particular, but also business services and construction and 
trade do worse in Scenario 4 than in the Reference Scenario. On the other hand, 
manufacturing does better, and by the mid-2020s value added is 5 per cent higher 
than in the Reference Scenario. As in Scenario 3, the output in electronic 
equipment industry increases relative to the Reference Scenario. This time, 
chemical products and ferrous metals also gain.  
 
Figure 27 Value added in constant prices, difference between Scenario 3 
and Reference Scenario, % 
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6.4.3 Foreign trade  
The introduction of the tariffs raises the share of the EEA countries in Finnish 
exports, much like in the previous scenario. On the other hand, exports to the 
non-EEA region will start to recover faster now. The sectoral mix of exports 
corresponds better to demand than in the Reference Scenario: the EEA being the 
main destination of the Finnish exports, the trade barriers “protect” the staus quo 
of the exports structure and thus trigger less changes to the production structure. 
Total manufacturing exports recover quickly, while the exports of services and 
primary goods remain lower than in the Reference Scenario. 
The trade account balance is much more positive in Scenario 4 than in the 
Reference Scenario. This is by far the best scenario from this perspective. 
Nevertheless, the terms of trade do not develop as well as they deteriorate 
dramatically when the higher tariffs are introduced. There is a gradual 
improvement in the terms of trade thereafter. 
 
Figure 28 Value of Finnish exports in Scenario 4, %-difference to Reference 
scenario 
 
 
 
6.4.4 Consumer utility and welfare 
As we can see from Figure 22a–c above, Scenario 4 is the worst scenario from 
the point of view of consumer utility for the world, the EU and Finland. It is the 
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only scenario where utility drops below that in the Reference Scenario (for the 
world and Finland). 
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7. Trade creation and trade diversion 
This section describes the impact of trade liberalisation on world trade under 
different policy regimes. We ask whether the measures create trade (and welfare) 
or whether they just divert trade between countries.  
From the global point of view the Russian WTO membership is a rather 
insignificant development, but looking at Figure 32 in the Appendix we see that 
e.g. for Finland it has its merits. 
The Doha agreement creates trade at an accelerating pace that peaks at around 
1.5 per cent increase in the value of world trade, compared to no trade 
liberalisation, when the agreement is fully implemented. On the other hand, the 
scenarios with higher-than-present tariffs show how much trade will be lost from 
a global four-block trade war. Some 9–10 per cent of world trade is wiped out. 
This means, roughly, that a 1% additional import tariff between blocs results in 
nearly 1% decrease in world trade. 
For Finland, we see from Figure 30 that the Russian WTO membership boost 
total trade by about 0.6 per cent. The impact of the Doha Round is about twice as 
large. The trade war in Scenarios 3 and 4 wipe out about 4.5 per cent of Finnish 
trade. Thereafter the situation improves but turns worse again in the late 2020s. 
Figure 31 shows the impacts of trade liberalisation or new barriers of trade for 
Finnish exporting industries by sector.  
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Figure 29 Impact of trade liberalisation on world trade under different 
policy regimes: %-difference in growth from 2010 between 
scenarios 
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Figure 30 Impact of trade liberalisation on Finnish trade under different 
policy regimes: %-difference in growth from 2010 between 
scenarios 
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 Figure 31 Impact of trade liberalisation on Finnish trade under different 
policy regimes – sector exports volumes 
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8. Discussion 
We have presented four scenarios which attempt to illustrate the impacts of trade 
policies under different contexts. Namely, we assess the effects of further 
liberalisation or introduction of new trade barriers in two different climate policy 
regimes: a unilateral European policy, roughly corresponding to the present 
situation, and a globally covering agreement. For Finnish exporting industries, 
trade liberalisation tends to reduce the exporting volumes of the traditional 
manufacturing sectors whereas especially services sector, but also for example 
food industry, benefit. Conversely, establishing new trade barriers tends to favour 
the old industries.  
The scenario with lower-than-current trade tariffs and a global climate policy is 
the best in terms of GDP and consumer utility in the world, EU and Finland. On 
the other hand, a global trade war with no global climate agreement is the worst 
scenario. For Finland the difference by 2030 between these two extreme 
scenarios is almost 6% of GDP and 14% of consumer utility, and increasing. On 
the other hand, this scenario is the worst one in terms of the Finnish trade 
balance. 
For nearly all sectors, the changes due to trade liberalisation or bloc formation 
are more favourable or less detrimental when a global climate policy agreement 
is in place. This effect is particularly clear for energy intensive industries. Our 
scenarios assume an increase in energy efficiency following climate policy 
implementation, which leads to higher productivity.  
However, there is a widespread agreement in the literature that also trade 
liberalisation alone leads to productivity growth. This can follow from increased 
imports or Foreign Direct Investment embedding new technology and thus 
facilitating technology transfer across borders. Exporting firms tend to be more 
productive than firms concentrating on domestic markets and thus, as increased 
exports raises the weight of exporting firms in the economy, increase of average 
productivity is observed. The GTAP model results reflect part of these effects, 
namely the more efficient allocation of production between regions, and also 
more efficient use of resources within a region. 
Trade liberalisation may also incur additional factors, which are not accounted 
for in this study, that lead to improved productivity. For example, the “New 
Theory of Trade” suggests that increasing returns to scale and expanding markets 
will allow industries to raise output, average cost will be lower. These 
productivity gains from trade are relatively easy to identify but hard to quantify. 
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Technical Annex 
The GTAP Model and Database 
The simulations in this study employ the VATT version of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database. The model is a recursive-dynamic 
applied general equilibrium model extended to better analyse energy and 
environment issues and take into account the various forms of agricultural 
subsidies. 
The model is built on the standard GTAP model and its dynamic (GTAP-Dyn) 
and environmental (GTAP-E) extensions. The original standard version (Hertel 
and Tsigas 1997) is a general equilibrium model, assuming perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale, by region and by commodity. The model allows for 
a sophisticated treatment of consumer demands, detailed treatment of 
international trade and transport costs. The GTAP-E extension (Burniaux and 
Truong 2002) can be used to evaluate the abatement costs and spill-over effects 
of greenhouse-gas reduction policies through international trade and interactions 
between sectors. GTAP-Dyn model (Ianchovichina and McDougall 2001) model 
permits a recursive solution procedure, a feature that allows easy implementation 
of dynamics without imposing limitations on the model's size. Adding to the 
standard GTAP model, it incorporates international capital mobility, capital 
accumulation, and accounting that keep track of foreign capital ownership with 
an adaptive expectations theory of investment. 
The VATT version of the model incorporates several additional features, 
including an enhanced treatment and reporting of energy commodities, which 
allows iterative simulation runs with VTT Times (Nordic) energy system model. 
In addition, an improved description of various taxes and subsidies are included. 
Bilateral trade is handled via the Armington (1969) assumption. Model results 
are derived from assumptions of firms and consumers optimising their behaviour 
within constraints given by endowments (land, labour, capital, natural resources) 
and policies (e.g. taxes). In the equilibrium solution, all markets are in 
equilibrium, i.e. demand equals supply. Trade policy instruments are represented 
in the GTAP database as ad valorem taxes and subsidies. For agricultural 
commodities, domestic support levels are calculated from the OECD (2008) 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE), and components for market price support are 
excluded to avoid double counting with the tariffs in the database.  
The term “general equilibrium” refers to the economy as an entity where 
everything affects everything and economic shocks impacting on any one 
component can have repercussions throughout the system. Depending on the 
simulation experiment (closure) different variables may be regarded as 
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exogenous (given to the model) or endogenous (solved within the model).GTAP 
model is a quite standard general equilibrium model assuming perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale technology. As a special feature which 
makes it suitable especially for studies related to developed and developing 
countries is the demand structure which takes into account the elasticity of 
demand for different commodities to be dependent on the income level. 
Simulation results depend partly on the original data and e.g. the input-output 
structure of the model. In the numerical model the price-responsive behaviour of 
actors (firms, households) also affect the results. The parameters or elasticities of 
the behavioural functions determine the magnitude of reactions of the economy. 
On the size of these parameters CGE models rely on outside information of 
econometric studies. CGE models rely heavily on national input-output tables as 
their primary source of data. In GTAP data base version 7.1, input-output tables 
of 112 regions have been combined together with data on bilateral trade flows 
between each sector in each country. Bilateraltrade flows make it possible to 
analyse changes in trade policy when reductions are occurring in only one 
country. That is why it suits this study in question very well. Apart from 
interlinking economies, GTAP database has a detailed structure of policy 
parameters, which have been implemented into the model by price-wedges 
between the competitive price and the market price. E.g tariff data is reported in 
ad valorem terms. 
GTAP model applications are widely used in research (Hertel et al. 2010, 
Valenzuela et al. 2009, Telleria et al. 2009, Martin et al. 2008, Walsh et al. 2007, 
Dimaranan et al. 2007) particularly in a broad scope of international trade. The 
GTAP 7.1 Database (Narayanan and Walmsley 2010) has been used in this 
study, representing the world economy for a given reference year -- 2004. For the 
reporting purposes, this data has been updated to 2010 values. The database 
comprises several types of data: behavioural parameters that include elasticities 
of substitution between domestic and imported goods, and elasticities of 
substitution between sources of imports (Armington elasticities). The main data 
file is derived from regional input-output tables, bilateral trade flows and 
protection data (taxes and subsidies). The database represents the world economy 
as flows of goods and services measured in millions of 2004 US dollars. 
Additional data is provided for capital stocks, population and savings. The 
database includes five endowments (i.e. production factors) -- land, skilled 
labour, unskilled labour, natural resources, and capital -- with 113 
countries/regions and 57 commodities/sectors. In this study, the database is 
aggregated into 18 countries/regions and 22 commodities/sectors (Table 1). 
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Table 2 Aggregation by sectors and regions 
 
Group/Type Sector in 
reporting  
Aggregated sector for 
simulations 
GTAP sectors included 
Primary agriculture  
Agrifood 
primary agriculture paddy rice, wheat, cereal 
grains nec, vegetables, 
fruit, nuts, oil seeds, sugar 
cane, sugar beet, plant-
based fibers, crops nec, 
bovine cattle, sheep and 
goats, horses, animal 
products nec, raw milk, 
wool, silk-worm cocoons 
Primary - others 
Primary 
primary forestry forestry 
primary fishing fishing 
primary minerals (ore) minerals nec 
Primary energy 
  
Energy 
primary coal coal 
  primary petroleum oil 
  primary gas gas 
Processed food 
Agrifood 
processed food bovine cattle, sheep and 
goat meat products, meat 
products, vegetable oils and 
fats, dairy products, 
processed rice, sugar, food 
products nec, beverages 
and tobacco products 
Manufacturing industries 
  
Energy-
intensive 
industry 
industries - wood 
products wood products 
  
industries - paper 
products, publishing paper products, publishing 
  
industries - chemical, 
rubber, plastic products 
chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
  
industries - ferrous 
metals ferrous metals 
  Machinery 
and 
equipment 
industries - motor 
vehicles and parts motor vehicles and parts 
  
industries - transport 
equipment nec transport equipment nec 
  
industries - machinery 
and equipment nec 
machinery and equipment 
nec 
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  Electronics 
industries - electronic 
equipment electronic equipment 
Other 
industries 
industries - goods nec textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather products, mineral 
products nec, metals nec, 
metal products, 
manufactures nec 
Energy 
industries – fuels petroleum, coal products, 
industries – electricity electricity 
  
industries – gas 
distribution
gas manufacture, 
distribution 
Services 
Construction services - construction water trade water, construction, trade 
Transportation services - transportation transport nec, water transport, air transport 
  
Business 
services 
services - specialiced 
business services, R&D business services nec 
Other services 
services - specialised nec communication, financial 
services nec, insurance, 
recreational and other 
services, public admin. and 
defence, education, health, 
ownership of dwellings 
 
Continent Region in 
reporting 
Aggregated region for 
simulations 
GTAP regions included 
 
Australia and Oceania  
High-income 
Asia-Pacific 
Australia and  
New Zealand 
Australia, New Zealand, 
Rest of Oceania  
Asia (Far East)  
China China China, Hong Kong  
  High-income 
Asia-Pacific 
Japan Japan  
  Korea Korea  
  India India India  
  
South-East Asia 
Rest of South and 
East Asia 
Taiwan, Rest of East Asia, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
People's Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Rest of 
Southeast Asia, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Rest of South Asia  
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North America  
  
North America 
USA United States of America  
Rest of North 
America 
Canada, Mexico, Rest of 
North America  
South America  
South America 
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay  
Rest of South 
America 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Rest of South America, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Rest of 
Central America, 
Caribbean  
Europe  
  
EEA 
Finland Finland  
EU27 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Bulgaria, 
Romania  
EFTA Switzerland, Norway, Rest 
of EFTA  
  
Eastern Europe 
Russia Russian Federation  
Eastern Europe etc. Albania, Belarus, Croatia, 
Ukraine, Rest of Eastern 
Europe, Rest of Europe, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, 
Rest of Former Soviet 
Union, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia  
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Africa and Middle East  
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Iran, Islamic Republic of, 
Turkey, Rest of Western 
Asia, Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Rest of North 
Africa  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Southern African 
Customs Union 
Botswana, South Africa, 
Rest of South African 
Customs Union 
 
 
LDCs in Africa Nigeria, Senegal, Rest of 
Western Africa, Central 
Africa, South Central 
Africa, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Rest of Eastern 
Africa  
 
 
 
Scenario descriptions 
A number of scenarios have been simulated with the GTAP model to assess the 
implications of various macro developments and policy options in medium and 
long run. All scenarios are for period 2004-2030, but the results in this report are 
usually reported beginning from 2010. Unless otherwise specified, the results are 
reported relative to the reference scenario that incorporates the European climate 
policies in place. Reference global growth rates follow the actual ones to date and 
the latest IMF projections for the rest of the simulation period 
The reference case scenario aims at representing the macro-economic driver 
variables in a business-as-usual world. Therefore, it incorporates the actual 
population, labour force and GDP growth and investment figures from 
international sources6 until 2010, as well as the latest available projections until 
2025. GDP and investment projections beyond the data provided by IMF, as well 
as regional forecasts for energy efficiency improvement, have been taken from 
the CEPII (2010) baseline scenario. The population and labour force projections 
are same in all scenarios, while the GDP growth is determined (endogenously) by 
the model in the policy scenarios. The reference case also incorporates EU’s 
                                              
6 IMF, EUROSTAT, United Nations, ILO 
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emission reduction commitments and the ETS, and assumes technological 
development required to achieve the 20% reduction in primary energy use. 
Policy scenarios are chosen to illustrate the impacts on global trade policy 
regimes under different technological progress environments related to climate 
policies. The simulated policies are illustrative and include relatively extreme 
changes in tariff levels.  
The following section describes the policies and developments included in one or 
more of the scenarios, as summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  Policies and developments included in the scenarios 
 
 Macro and Technology Climate policies Trade policies 
 International 
projections 
and forecasts 
 
Technology 
in Europe 
 
Global 
technology 
boost 
 
EU2020 
 
Global 
climate 
policy 
 
Russia 
in 
WTO 
Doha 
round 
Trading 
blocs 
Reference 
Scenario 
All Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
Scenario 1: 
Sustainable 
prosperity 
All except 
GDP & 
prices 
Yes Yes Included 
in global 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Scenario 2: 
multilateralism 
All except 
GDP & 
prices 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Scenario 3: 
Mutual 
suspicion 
All except 
GDP & 
prices 
Yes Yes Included 
in global 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Scenario 4: 
blocs 
All except 
GDP & 
prices 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Macro development 
International projections and forecasts 
GDP 
Gross domestic product growth rates in the reference scenario follow the IMF 
projection until 2016 and the CEPII baseline scenario from there on. In policy 
scenarios, the GDP growth changes as a result of simulations. Annual average 
growth rates 2010-2030 are presented below. 
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Table 4 Annual GDP growth, 2010-2030 average 
 
 
Finland 1.9 %  Australia and NZL 2.3 % 
Rest of EU27 1.6 %  Japan 1.3 % 
EFTA 1.8 %  Korea 2.2 % 
Eastern Europe etc. 2.2 %  China 7.7 % 
Russia 2.9 %  India 6.9 % 
Rest of North 
America 2.9 % 
 
Rest of S and E Asia 4.9 % 
USA 2.2 %  The Arab World 4.0 % 
Rest of South 
America 3.5 % 
 
LDCs in Africa 6.8 % 
Mercosur 3.2 %  Southern Africa Customs Union 3.3 % 
 
 
Population  
Regional population growth rates follow the World Population Prospects middle-
scenario (United Nations 2008) in all simulated scenarios. Annual average 
growth rates 2010-2030 are as follows. 
Table 5 Annual population growth, 2010-2030 average 
 
 
Finland 0.2 %  Australia and NZL 1.1 % 
Rest of EU27 0.1 %  Japan -0.4 % 
EFTA 0.5 %  Korea 0.1 % 
Eastern Europe etc. -0.4 %  China 0.4 % 
Russia -0.4 %  India 1.0 % 
Rest of North America 0.7 %  Rest of S and E Asia 1.1 % 
USA 0.8 %  The Arab World 1.2 % 
Rest of South America 1.0 %  LDCs in Africa 2.2 % 
Mercosur 0.6 %  Southern Africa Customs Union 0.5 % 
 
Labour 
Labour force growth follows the ILO (2008) projections for years and regions 
available. For the remaining data points, the World Population Prospects working 
age population projection has been used instead. The overall labour force growth 
rates have been allocated to unskilled and skilled labour separately using the 
information from the CEPII baseline scenario. 
Simulations also include an exogenous component of Labour productivity 
growth, which follows the development similar to the CEPII baseline scenario. 
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Table 6 Annual labour force growth, 2010-2030 average 
 
 
Finland -0.1 %  Australia and NZL 1.1 % 
Rest of EU27 0.1 %  Japan -0.7 % 
EFTA 0.6 %  Korea 0.3 % 
Eastern Europe etc. 0.4 %  China 0.2 % 
Russia -0.9 %  India 1.6 % 
Rest of North America 1.2 %  Rest of S and E Asia 1.8 % 
USA 0.6 %  The Arab World 2.1 % 
Rest of South America 1.9 %  LDCs in Africa 2.8 % 
Mercosur 1.2 %  Southern Africa Customs Union 0.7 % 
 
 
Energy efficiency 
In the reference scenario, an annual increase or decrease in energy efficiency is 
assumed to follow the projections provided by the CEPII baseline scenario. 
These figures are relatively modest and only reflect long-term technological 
development trends. These growth rates are increased for regions participating in 
climate policy. 
Table 7 Annual energy efficiency growth, 2010-2030 average 
 
 
Finland 0.7 % Australia and NZL 0.0 % 
Rest of EU27 0.5 % Japan 0.5 % 
EFTA 0.2 % Korea 1.6 % 
Eastern Europe etc. 1.5 % China 0.6 % 
Russia 2.5 % India 1.1 % 
Rest of North America 1.5 % Rest of S and E Asia 0.7 % 
USA 1.1 % The Arab World 0.9 % 
Rest of South America 0.3 % LDCs in Africa -1.0 % 
Mercosur 0.7 % Southern Africa Customs Union -0.3 % 
 
 
Technology in Europe 
Additional energy efficiency related to EU20-20-20 policies is assumed in all 
scenarios. The efficiency growth is adjusted so that the policy goal of reducing 
primary energy use by 20% compared to 1990 level is met. Reference data 
employs the results from simultaneous model runs with the Nordic Times Energy 
Systems model conducted previously in the Nordic Energy Perspectives project 
(NEP 2010). 
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Global technology boost 
Accelerated energy efficiency improvement is assumed for all regions 
participating in climate policy. In the scenarios with global climate policy 
(scenarios 1 and 3), all regions benefit from an overall 0.5% additional annual 
increase in energy efficiency.  
Primary products and food 
In the reference case, world price for petroleum, ore, agricultural products and 
food drive the simulation results very strongly. Global output of these products 
has been adjusted so that the world price follows international forecasts / long 
term trends. The average annual world price increases in the reference case are 
3.8% for primary agriculture products, 5,9% for food, 3.4% for iron ore, and 
5.2% for crude oil and gas. 
Climate policies 
EU2020 
All scenarios assume that the EU (and EFTA) maintains at least its current 
climate policy. Until 2020, the reductions are according to the adopted EU20-20-
20 regime, i.e. reduction of all CO2 emissions by 20% compared to 
1990.Between years 2010 and 2020, this requires a 1% annual decrease. In the 
heavy industry sectors, emissions trading possibility is assumed. On the other 
sectors, a CO2-tax is introduced. Same trend is assumed to continue also beyond 
2020.  
Global climate policy 
In scenarios 1 and 3, a global commitment to GHG emissions reduction is 
introduced. A reduction of CO2 emissions by 1% annually is assumed in all 
regions outside Europe starting 2010. In EU and EFTA, a more ambitious 
commitment is made. 
Trade policy 
Russia in WTO 
Russian WTO membership, which has been approved, is assumed in all 
scenarios. This implies cutting import tariffs to Russia by 19-23% depending on 
sector, and reduction of agricultural subsidies by half. Tariff cuts are 
implemented in three stages 2012, 2014 an 2018, where the sectors with sensitive 
status face liberalisation later. Market access of Russian products to other regions 
is improved in same proportion. 
Doha round 
Doha round tariff reductions follow the most liberal proposal, corresponding to 
“Scenario B” in Laborde and Martin (2010). As the tariff barriers for 
manufactured products are already low in most industrialised countries, the most 
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significant tariff cuts take place for agricultural commodities and in developing 
countries. In addition to import tariff cuts, agricultural export subsidies are 
abolished. Policies are implemented in 2013, 2015 and 2017 for High Income 
Countries, and 2019, 2021 and 2023 for developing and newly admitted 
countries.  
Detailed descriptions of the tariffs in the GTAP data before and after the Doha 
implementation are available for Non Agricultural goods in 
http://gatt.ifpri.info/files/2010/12/NAMA_LabordeMartin_Draft.pdf;  
and for Agricultural goods in 
http://gatt.ifpri.info/files/2010/12/AMA_LabordeMartin_Draft.pdf .  
Trading blocs 
In this extreme trade policy vision, the world is divided into four blocks: Western 
Europe (=EEA), Eastern Europe (Russia + FSU), Americas, and “The Chinese 
Hegemony” (China, South-East Asia, Developing Africa). Australia, Japan, 
Korea, India and the Arab world region are left outside any bloc. All countries 
increase their import tariffs by 10%, except for imports from the members of the 
same block.  
Regional adjustments 
Finland  
The GTAP model assumes similar behavioural parameters for firms and 
consumers in all regions. To better account for the special characteristics of the 
Finnish economy, structural developments in the Reference scenario have been 
partly aligned with the 2004-2025 VATTAGE  (Finnish one-country AGE 
model) scenario, including: 
• macro variables 
• industrial outputs 
• imports and exports from EU / Non-EU 
A series of auxiliary simulations were conducted for this adjustment. The 
development of the sector-specific outputs in Finland were first fixed to 
correspond to the VATTAGE model results assuming the foreign trade 
development to also follow the path produced in the same results. As the 
VATTAGE model does not model international trade explicitly, the adjustment 
variables that were acquired from the first simulation for the industry outputs 
were used in a second simulation where the constraints on foreign trade were 
released.  
In the reference scenario, Finland’s total trade is allowed to grow /decrease more 
in the simulation period (2010-2030) compared to the VATTAGE model results, 
which does not fully account for the growth in global demand. (This affects, in 
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particular, raw materials / ore demand). Cumulative value (at the end of 2030) of 
the “trading preference” or “shadow tariff” variable, obtained by fitting Finland’s 
trade and production changes with VATTAGE model baseline, is decrease by 
half.  
Increase in primary energy (oil and gas) prices described above together with the 
adjusted production and trade Finland leads to a simulated trade balance deficit 
that exceeds currently observed trends. We estimate that oil price effect in the 
simulations accounts for USD 2.5 to 3.5 billion of annual deficits. 
China 
China’s economy has a considerable impact on global trade, in particular on 
products mentioned above (Food, Fuels, Ore).  Several adjustments has been 
made to bring the base line simulation results closer to the observed / forecasted 
developments: 
• investments has been fixed to follow the CEPII scenario 
• land and natural resources availability decreases 
• an arbitrary (1%) annual improvement in manufacturing sectors productivity, 
to reflect structural changes in the economy. 
Beginning capital stock corrected to allow predicted investments levels. 
Russia 
Whilst the effect of the Russian WTO membership, included in the reference 
scenario, on global trade is relatively modest (see figure 29), it has more 
significance to Finnish exports. Figure 32 illustrates that most Finnish industries 
benefit from a 10%-25% annual increase in exports to Russia immediately 
following the WTO-related trade liberalisation. On the longer term, the positive 
effect on imports is reduced to 7%-15%.  
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Figure 32 Finnish exports to Russia, the impact of Russian WTO 
membership 
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